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The Effect of Electronic Commerce on Geographic Trade and Price Variance in a Business-to-
Business Market 
 
By: Eric Overby and Chris Forman, Georgia Institute of Technology 
 
Abstract: Imbalances in supply and demand often cause the price for the same good to vary across 
geographic locations. Economic theory suggests that if the price differential is greater than the cost of 
transporting the good between locations, then buyers will shift demand from high-price locations to low-
price locations, while sellers will shift supply from low-price locations to high-price locations. This 
should make prices more uniform and cause the overall market to adhere more closely to the “law of one 
price.” However, this assumes that traders have the information necessary to shift their supply/demand in 
an optimal way. We investigate this using data on over 2 million transactions in the wholesale used 
vehicle market from 2003 to 2008. This market has traditionally consisted of a set of non-integrated 
regional markets centered on market facilities located throughout the United States. Supply / demand 
imbalances and frictions associated with trading across distance created significant geographic price 
variance for generally equivalent vehicles. During our sample period, the percentage of transactions 
conducted electronically in this market rose from approximately 0% to approximately 20%. We argue that 
the electronic channel reduces buyers’ information search costs and show that buyers are more sensitive 
to price and less sensitive to distance when purchasing via the electronic channel than via the traditional 
physical channel. This causes buyers to be more likely to shift demand away from a nearby facility where 
prices are high to a more remote facility where prices are low. We show that these “cross-facility” 
demand shifts have led to a 25% reduction in geographic price variance during the time frame of our 
sample. We also show that sellers are reacting to these market shifts by becoming less strategic about 
vehicle distribution, given that vehicles are increasingly likely to fetch a similar price regardless of where 
they are sold.   
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1.0 Introduction 
Supply and demand forces often cause the price for the same good to vary across geographic 
locations. Economic theory suggests that if the price differential is greater than the cost of transporting the 
good between locations, then buyers will shift demand from high-price locations to low-price locations, 
while sellers will shift supply from low-price locations to high-price locations. These shifts should lead to 
a market in which price of a good does not differ between any two locations by more than the cost of 
transport between them. In other words, the market should obey the “law of one price.” However, this 
expectation is based on the assumption that traders have the information necessary to shift their 
supply/demand in an optimal way. If this information is costly to acquire, then there is no reason to expect 
markets to obey the “law of one price.” As such, information search costs have been offered as an 
explanation for the repeated violation of the “law of one price” in many markets (see Baye et al., 2006 for 
a review). In his seminal paper on this topic, Stigler (1961) noted that the cost of searching for and acting 
upon market information will increase with the geographic size and dispersion of the market. This leads 
to imbalances in supply and demand across locations, creating geographic segmentation within markets.  
Because electronic commerce reduces search costs by making information available at the click of a 
mouse (Brynjolfsson & Smith, 2000), electronic channels have the potential to break down many of the 
geographic barriers that have traditionally segmented markets. The elimination of these barriers can have 
dramatic effects for buyer and seller behavior and for overall market efficiency. For example, electronic 
commerce lowers buyer search costs (Bakos, 1997), which makes it easier for buyers to collect price 
information from regions outside their local geographies. If buyers discover that prices are lower in a 
geographic region outside their own, then they can use electronic channels to shift their purchasing to the 
lower-price region. This shifting of demand should cause prices across regions to become less variable, 
thereby more closely reflecting the “law of one price.” As prices become more uniform, sellers should 
become less strategic about how they distribute products across locations, because products will fetch a 
similar price regardless of where they are sold.   
We use the United States wholesale used vehicle market as the context in which to study whether and 
how buyers use electronic channels to shift their demand geographically, the effect this has on geographic 
price variance, and how sellers respond to these changes in the market. This market is well-suited to our 
analysis for several reasons. First, the wholesale used vehicle market has traditionally consisted of a set of 
non-integrated regional markets centered on market facilities located throughout the U.S. at which 
transactions were conducted based on physical collocation of buyers, sellers, and vehicles. This 
geographic segmentation and the associated imbalances in supply and demand caused prices for generally 
equivalent vehicles to vary across locations by more than the cost of transport. Second, the percentage of 
trades conducted electronically rose steadily over our sample period, growing from approximately 0% in 
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2003 to approximately 20% by mid-2008. This evolution permits a longitudinal analysis of whether and 
how the increase in electronic trading affected buyer behavior, seller behavior, and the variance of prices 
across market locations. An interesting feature of the empirical context is that the electronic channel is 
specific to buyers. Sellers do not use the electronic channel, although buyers’ use of the channel may 
prompt behavioral changes by the sellers. This feature permits us to investigate how the electronic 
channel has affected demand and how supply has adjusted. Third, the wholesale used vehicle market is 
representative of other geographically segmented markets such as those for agricultural crops, livestock, 
seafood, fuels, building materials, and heavy machinery (e.g., Aker, 2010; Diekmann et al., 2008; Jensen, 
2007). Our findings about whether and how electronic trading has affected trader behavior and market 
efficiency in the wholesale used vehicle market should help us understand similar phenomena in other 
markets.  
We have detailed transaction data for over 2 million vehicles sold in the market from 2003 to 2008. 
Among other variables, we observe the transaction price, the make/model of each vehicle, the location of 
each vehicle (there are over 80 market locations across the U.S. at which vehicles are sold), the location 
of each buyer based on his zip code, and whether the buyer purchased the vehicle via the traditional 
physical channel or via the electronic channel. We pose four research questions. First, do buyers use the 
electronic channel to extend their purchasing reach to more remote locations? We find that they do; 
buyers are approximately 29% less sensitive to distance when purchasing via the electronic channel than 
via the physical channel. Second, do buyers use the reach of the electronic channel to shift their demand 
to other locations to take advantage of lower prices? We find that they do; buyers are approximately 
194% more sensitive to price when purchasing via the electronic channel than via the physical channel. 
Third, are these demand shifts associated with reduced price variance across locations? We find that they 
are; a one standard deviation increase in the number of vehicles of a given model (e.g., Ford Ranger, 
Toyota Camry) that buyers purchase from remote locations is associated with a 13% decrease in price 
variance for vehicles of that model across the U.S. Fourth, how do sellers react to the reduction in 
geographic price variance in the market? Sellers choose the location at which to sell vehicles, and we find 
that sellers placed less weight on recent prices at a location when making distribution decisions as 
electronic trading increased. We conclude that this is because distributing vehicles to locations where 
prices have recently been high becomes less valuable as buyers become increasingly likely to use the 
electronic channel to shift demand out of those locations. 
The study draws upon and contributes to two main research streams. The first, second, and fourth 
research questions relate primarily to the research stream on how electronic commerce affects geographic 
trade (e.g., Blum & Goldfarb, 2006; Hortacsu et al., 2009). The third research question relates primarily 
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to the research stream on how electronic commerce affects price dispersion1 (e.g., Chellappa et al., 2011; 
Clay et al., 2002; Clemons et al., 2002). The second and third research questions create the linkage 
between these two research streams by asking how the shifting of demand across geographic locations 
facilitated by electronic commerce affects price variance across those locations. 
We contribute to both research streams in several ways. First, prior empirical studies have examined 
whether reduced buyer search costs in electronic channels lead to lower price dispersion (e.g., Brown & 
Goolsbee, 2002). Although many of these studies have demonstrated significant changes in price 
dispersion, they typically have not examined the micro-level buyer behavior that leads to that outcome. 
We use a discrete choice model using individual buyer transactions across both physical and electronic 
channels to examine the behavioral mechanism by which reduced buyer search costs lead to lower price 
dispersion.2 Our results show that buyers are more sensitive to price and less sensitive to distance when 
using the electronic channel compared to the physical channel. As a result, they shift purchases from 
nearby locations where prices are relatively high to remote locations where prices are relatively low. 
These cross-location demand shifts -- which have become more common over time -- represent the 
mechanism through which changes in buyer behavior have led to lower price dispersion across 
geographic locations. Observing this mechanism is critical for continued empirical research about 
electronic channels and price dispersion because different assumptions about the mechanism can result in 
more or less price dispersion when modeled analytically (Baye et al., 2006). We build upon the results of 
the choice model by using fixed effects panel regression to attempt to quantify the relationship between 
cross-location demand shifts and geographic price dispersion. 
Second, existing empirical research on how electronic channels influence price dispersion has 
generally ignored the geographic location of products as a factor in influencing their price and therefore 
their price dispersion. This is because location has been irrelevant for the types of products that have 
typically been studied (e.g., books, consumer electronics, and tickets), because the cost of shipping the 
product to the buyer -- which is a component of the overall price paid by the buyer -- is the same 
regardless of the product’s location. However, shipping costs vary significantly with location for products 
such as automobiles, agricultural commodities, fuels, and metals, the dollar value of trade for which is 
substantially larger than that for goods more commonly studied.3 For these products, the distance between 
buyers and products influences the prices that buyers pay, which in turn affects the dispersion of prices 
                                                            
1 We use the terms “price variance” and “price dispersion” interchangeably. 
2 For examples of how reductions in seller search costs influence price dispersion in the context of commodity food 
markets in developing countries, see Aker (2010) and Jensen (2007). 
3 For example, U.S. retail sales for automobiles were approximately 30 times larger than that for books and CD’s in 
2002. Source: U.S. Census, http://www.census.gov/econ/census02/data/us/US000_44.HTM.  
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for those products at different locations. We examine the location of products and buyers and find that the 
distance between them influences when buyers use physical vs. electronic channels and weakens the 
relationship between cross-location demand shifts and price dispersion.  
Third, most of the existing research on price dispersion has studied fixed price environments by 
analyzing prices posted by sellers. By contrast, we study an environment in which prices are determined 
by auction. This allows us to observe the actual transacted prices in the market, rather than just the posted 
prices, which is unusual in this stream (but see Ghose and Yao (2011) for a recent exception). 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical context and data. Section 3 discusses 
how the steady increase in electronic trading between 2003 and 2008 might have influenced buyer/seller 
behavior and geographic price variance. Section 4 presents our empirical models and analysis. Section 5 
summarizes the results, limitations, and contributions of the study. 
 
2.0 Empirical Context 
The empirical context of the study is the wholesale used vehicle market. This is a business-to-
business market in which buyers and sellers trade used vehicles. The buyers are used car dealers who 
purchase vehicles in the wholesale market for resale to retail customers. Used car dealers procure 
approximately 35% of their used vehicle inventory via the wholesale market (Source: NADA Data 2009 
(www.nada.org/nadadata), page 10.) The sellers are either other dealers or institutional sellers such as 
rental car companies and the captive finance arms of automotive manufacturers. The main reason for a 
dealer to sell in the wholesale market is if he does not wish to (or cannot) sell a vehicle in the retail 
market. In this case, he will sell the vehicle wholesale to another dealer who will retail the vehicle. 
Institutional sellers sell in the wholesale market because they often lack retail operations and because the 
wholesale market is a highly liquid environment for selling multiple vehicles. Approximately 9 million 
vehicles are exchanged in the market each year (Source: National Auto Auction Association 
(www.naaa.com.))  
There are several intermediaries that provide services in the market, including aggregating buyers and 
sellers, providing storage while vehicles are pending sale (referred to as “marshalling”), and providing 
transaction assurance. The intermediaries also operate physical market facilities at which transactions are 
conducted. Market facilities are located throughout the U.S. as well as the world, although our analysis is 
specific to the U.S. Sellers transport vehicles to market facilities where buyers purchase them via an 
auction process. Each vehicle that is auctioned is driven – one at a time – into a warehouse-type building 
into the midst of a group of buyers. A human auctioneer solicits bids from the buyers in an ascending, 
open outcry format, i.e., a traditional English auction. Once the auctioneer can solicit no additional bids, 
the seller indicates to the auctioneer whether he will accept the high bid. The vehicle is then driven away, 
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and the next vehicle is driven into place and the process repeats. It is common for vehicles of the same 
model j (e.g., Toyota Camry) to be auctioned one after another. It is also common for auctions to be 
conducted at multiple facilities concurrently. After purchasing a vehicle, the buyer is responsible for 
transporting the vehicle to his dealership. The cost of transportation is non-trivial and increases with 
distance.  
2.1 The Electronic “Webcast” Channel: The physical process described above remains the 
predominant method by which vehicles are exchanged in the wholesale market in the United States. 
However, an increasing percentage of transactions are conducted electronically. The most popular 
electronic channel is the webcast channel. The webcast channel consists of an Internet browser-based 
application that streams live audio and video of the physical auctions. Buyers can use the application to 
place bids on vehicles in competition with the buyers who are physically present at the facility. This has 
given buyers a choice for how to participate in the bidding for a vehicle: they can either participate 
physically in the traditional fashion or electronically using the webcast channel.  
It is worth highlighting two points about the webcast channel. First, the webcast channel does not 
affect the price discovery mechanism. The auctioneer solicits bids for each vehicle in an ascending 
fashion; this price discovery process is not affected by the channel buyers use to place bids. Second, the 
webcast channel is specific to buyers; sellers do not use it. Sellers present their vehicles in the same 
fashion -- having them driven through the physical market facility -- regardless of whether buyers are 
using the physical or the electronic “webcast” channels to place bids.4  
2.2 Data Description: The data we use to examine our research questions were provided by an 
intermediary in the wholesale used vehicle market that operates over 80 physical market facilities in the 
continental U.S., all of which are equipped with the webcast technology. The data consist of all vehicles 
with between 15,000 and 21,000 miles that were auctioned (both successfully and unsuccessfully) at those 
facilities between January 2003 and June 2008. The mileage filter reduces heterogeneity in vehicle 
condition, so that prices for vehicles of the same model across facilities may be more validly compared. 
The low mileage of vehicles in the sample also increases the likelihood that vehicles are of predictable 
                                                            
4 The webcast channel is not the only method by which buyers can purchase vehicles electronically. There are also 
stand-alone electronic markets that operate in the industry. The key distinction between the two is that the webcast 
channel augments the physical market, while the electronic markets are separate from it. We limit our analysis to the 
webcast channel for two reasons. First, the vast majority of electronic transactions are conducted via the webcast 
channel. In our data, webcast transactions outnumber the other electronic transactions over 8 to 1. Second, the stand-
alone electronic markets typically offer a fixed price option to buyers, and there is no human auctioneer to solicit 
bids. This creates differences in the price discovery mechanism that could confound our results. For simplicity, all 
references to the electronic channel are specific to the webcast channel. 
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quality, such that they may be traded effectively via either the physical or electronic channels (Overby & 
Jap, 2009). The data contain 3,591,443 auctions, 2,340,357 of which resulted in a sale. Of these, 
2,059,832 were purchased by buyers using the physical channel (88%) and 280,525 were purchased by 
buyers using the webcast channel (12%). The percentage of vehicles traded electronically increased from 
just over 0% to approximately 20% over this time period. The data contain 74,917 unique buyer ID’s. 
According to the 2007 U.S. Economic Census, there are 50,808 automobile dealers in the United States; 
the number of buyer ID’s is higher because many dealers have more than one employee authorized to 
purchase in the wholesale market. The number of buyer ID’s in the data and the likelihood that most used 
car dealers purchase at least some vehicles with between 15,000 and 21,000 miles increase our confidence 
that our sample is representative of the buyer population in this market. Table 1 describes the variables in 
the data. We used the Facility Zip Code and Buyer Zip Code variables to calculate the distance (in miles) 
between facilities and between buyers and facilities. 
Table 1: Variables and descriptive statistics. 
Variable Description Descriptive Statistics 
Facility ID Denotes the market facility where the vehicle was located. There are 81 facility ID’s. 
Facility Zip Code Zip code of each market facility. n/a 
Buyer ID Denotes the buyer who purchased a vehicle. There are 74,917 buyer ID’s. 
Buyer Zip Code Zip code of each buyer. n/a 
Sold? Dummy variable for whether the vehicle was sold (1) or not (0). Mean: 0.65 
Seller ID Denotes the seller of each vehicle. There are 28,791 seller IDs. 
Webcast? Dummy variable indicating whether the vehicle was purchased 
via the webcast (1) or physical (0) channels. 
Mean: 0.12 
Auction Date Date each vehicle was auctioned. From 1/1/2003 to 6/30/2008. 
Vehicle Model Model of each vehicle (e.g., Ford Focus, Nissan Maxima.) There are 834 vehicle models.
Price Sales price of each vehicle. Mean: 14,819; St. Dev.: 6,834
Valuation Market value estimate for each vehicle on the Auction Date. 
Calculated by the intermediary based on transactions for similar 
vehicles in the 30 days prior to the Auction Date. 
Mean: 15,005; St. Dev.: 6,768
Normalized Price Price divided by Valuation. Mean: 0.99; St. Dev.: 0.09 
Condition Grade Grade (0-5 scale, measured in 0.1 increments) assigned by the 
intermediary to indicate each vehicle’s wear and tear. Higher 
grades indicate better condition. 
Mean: 3.29; St. Dev.: 0.70 
Mileage Odometer reading of each vehicle. Mean: 18,070; St. Dev.: 1,734
Age Date the vehicle was auctioned minus January 1 of the vehicle’s 
year. Measured in days. May be negative, e.g., if a 2008 model 
vehicle was auctioned in December 2007. 
Mean: 545; St. Dev.: 714 
 
2.2.1: Assigning Buyers to Local Facilities: In order to test some of our hypotheses, it was necessary 
to assign each buyer to a facility in their geographic area, referred to as the buyer’s “local” facility. We 
did this as follows. First, we calculated the average distance each buyer traveled to make purchases via 
the traditional physical channel. This statistic was 125 miles (s.d. 185.) We then determined which 
facilities were within 125 miles of each buyer. If a buyer had exactly one facility within a 125 mile radius, 
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we assigned him to that facility. If a buyer had more than one facility within this radius, we calculated the 
facility from which he made the most physical purchases and assigned him to that facility. We assigned 
buyers who were located farther than 125 miles from the nearest facility to the facility closest to them. 
This procedure yields the same assignments as a procedure in which each buyer is assigned to the closest 
facility, with the exception of those buyers who are close to multiple facilities. We used this procedure so 
that buyers were assigned to nearby facilities that they actually visited, rather than to whichever facility 
was simply the closest. 
3.0 Geographic Price Variance and Buyer/Seller Behavior 
3.1 Geographic Price Variance: We first present some summary statistics. We calculated the average 
price of vehicles of each make/model (e.g., Toyota Camry, Ford Escape) at each facility in each quarter-
year. We then calculated the variation in those average prices across facilities (using the coefficient of 
variation) in each quarter-year. We label this CVjt, where j indexes the make/model and t indexes the 
quarter-year. For example, assume that the average price for Toyota Camry’s in Q1 2003 was $12,000 at 
the Charlotte facility, $14,000 at the Orlando facility, and $10,000 at the Nashville facility. In this case, 
CVjt = (2,000 / 12,000) = 0.16. We then averaged CVjt across all make/models j in each quarter-year to get 
a measure of the overall variance of prices in the market. We plotted this statistic for each quarter-year. 
This is shown in Figure 1, along with the percentage of electronic transactions. Geographic price 
dispersion declines as electronic transaction activity increases. The main goal of our analysis is to study 
this relationship. 
Figure 1: Proportion of electronic transactions and coefficient of variation of prices across facilities per 
quarter-year. 
 
A key reason why geographic price variance exists in the market is imbalances in supply and demand 
across facilities. The supply at a facility is determined by the number of vehicles being auctioned at the 
facility. The demand at a facility is determined by the number of buyers purchasing at the facility. Figure 
2 provides an illustration. The graphic shows three market facilities: Charlotte, Miami, and New Orleans. 
Supply is illustrated by the vehicle icons; demand is illustrated by the person icons. The blue numbers 
represent (hypothetical) average vehicle prices as a percentage of market value at each facility on a given 
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Thus, we posit that buyers use the electronic channel to re-distribute their demand from facilities 
where prices are high to facilities where prices are low. This should decrease geographic price variance. 
We posit that sellers react to how buyers are using the electronic channel by placing less weight on recent 
prices at a facility when making distribution decisions. This is because distributing vehicles to facilities 
where prices have recently been high becomes less valuable as buyers become increasingly likely to shift 
demand out of those facilities. Thus, we posit that buyers are using the electronic channel in a way that 
reduces geographic price variance and that sellers are reacting to buyer behavior in a rational manner.5 
 
4.0 Models and Results 
In this section, we investigate potential changes to buyer and seller behavior attributable to the 
electronic channel. We also consider whether these changes might explain the reduction in geographic 
price variance illustrated in Figure 1. 
4.1 Buyer Behavior: As noted in Section 3, the relevant buyer behavior for our analysis is how buyers 
choose the facilities at which to purchase vehicles. We hypothesize that buyers will make different 
choices depending on whether they are using the physical or electronic channel (which is itself a choice), 
with buyers’ facility choices less affected by distance but more affected by price when using the 
electronic channel. We developed a discrete choice model to investigate this. We assume that a buyer is 
purchasing a vehicle(s) of a particular make/model j (e.g., Ford Taurus) on day t. He can purchase that 
vehicle at any facility at which vehicles of make/model j are auctioned on day t. Each facility provides 
differential utility to the buyer based on prices at the facility, the distance to the facility, the supply of 
vehicles available at the facility, and the condition of the vehicles available at the facility. We measured 
price (NormPricejkt) as the average normalized price (normalized price = price / valuation; see Table 1) 
                                                            
5 It is possible to model this formally via a sequential game in which a seller moves first by choosing a facility at 
which to auction a vehicle. The two main considerations for the seller are the distance to the facility (due to 
transportation costs) and historical prices at the facility (to try to exploit geographic price variance by selling where 
demand is most likely to be high). A buyer moves second and is of one of two types: he either uses the webcast 
channel or he does not. If the buyer uses the webcast channel, then he has the option to bid at his “local” facility or 
to shift his bid to a remote facility, which he will do if the price difference between facilities is sufficiently high. Let 
μ denote the probability that the buyer uses the webcast channel. As μ increases, it becomes more likely that a given 
buyer will shift his bid away from his local facility if prices there are high. This demand-shifting thwarts (to some 
extent) the seller’s attempt to achieve above average prices; recognizing this, she will place less weight on historical 
prices (and more on other factors) when making distribution decisions as μ increases. 
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for vehicles of model j sold at facility k on day t.6 NormPricejkt is unobserved when none of the vehicles 
of model j auctioned at facility k on day t are sold. This occurs 11.8% of the time. We set NormPricejkt 
equal to 1 when unobserved for two reasons. First, a vehicle g’s valuation (Valuationg) is highly 
correlated with its price (Priceg); a simple regression of Priceg on Valuationg for sold vehicles yields a 
valuation coefficient of 0.99 and an R2 of 0.96. Thus, using an imputed value = 1 (meaning that Priceg = 
Valuationg) is a reasonable strategy. Second, we assume that buyers impute prices in this same manner, 
i.e., when price information is not available, they assume that prices, if observed, would be equal to 
valuations.7 We measured distance (Distanceik) as the number of miles between buyer i’s zip code and 
facility k’s zip code. We measured supply (Supplyjkt) as the number of vehicles of model j auctioned at 
facility k on day t. We measured average condition (AvgConditionjkt) as the average condition grade 
assigned to vehicles of model j auctioned at facility k on day t. The condition grade of vehicles 
(ConditionGradeg) is not recorded for approximately one-third of the vehicles. We imputed 
ConditionGradeg for those vehicles based on: a) the average condition grade for vehicles of the same 
model j sold at the same facility k over the prior 21 days, b) the vehicle’s mileage, and c) the vehicle’s 
age. Specifically, we regressed ConditionGradeg (when observed) on these three variables and used the 
resulting coefficients to impute ConditionGradeg when not observed. We also included alternative-
specific constants in the choice model to capture the latent utility of each facility. Table 2 provides 
descriptive statistics for these and other variables described later in this section. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for variables in the buyer choice model. 
Variable Description Mean (St. Dev.) 
NormPricejkt Average normalized price (price / valuation) for vehicles of model j sold at 
facility k on day t. 
0.99 (0.13) 
Distanceik Average distance between buyer i and each facility k in buyer i’s choice set. 451.99 (348.77) 
Supplyjkt Number of vehicles of model j auctioned at facility k on day t. 6.32 (11.59) 
Avg 
Conditionjkt 
Average condition grade of vehicles of model j auctioned at facility k on day t. 3.23 (0.59) 
Electronic_ 
Propensityit 
Proportion of buyer i’s 10 (or fewer if necessary) purchases prior to day t made 
via the webcast channel. 
0.08 (0.22) 
 
                                                            
6 We also included in the model the average normalized price for vehicles of model j sold at facility k for the 21 days 
prior to day t (RecentNormPricejkt) to account for the possibility that buyers consider recent historical prices at a 
facility when making decisions. This variable was not significant at the 10% level. 
7 Price (and other variables) is commonly imputed in choice models, because the price of non-chosen alternatives in 
a choice set is often unobserved. This often results in choice models in which price is imputed [(n-1)/n]*100 percent 
of the time, where n is the number of alternatives (e.g., see Bucklin et al., 2008, p. 480; Chiou, 2009, p. 292). Our 
level of imputation is much less because we usually observe average prices of non-chosen alternatives. 
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The complete buyer choice set is quite large, as is the number of parameters given the inclusion of the 
alternative-specific constants for each facility. This size makes model estimation unstable and 
convergence difficult, particularly for choice model formulations other than the conditional logit. To 
achieve an estimable model, we took a geographic subset of the sample by analyzing only the purchases 
made by buyers local to the facilities in the western U.S., which consists of the facilities in Arizona, 
California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, and Washington. We also limited the choice 
set to facilities within this region. We estimated the model using this sub-sample for two reasons. First, it 
is large enough geographically to allow us to examine whether buyers’ sensitivity to distance is affected 
by the electronic channel. Second, 93.7% of purchases by buyers local to facilities within this region are 
from facilities within this region, which allows us to consider it a microcosm of the entire market. The 
filtered choice data set consists of 313,252 choices and 18 facilities.  
As a first step in our analysis, we divided the sample into observations in which the buyer purchased 
via the physical channel and those in which the buyer purchased via the electronic channel. We then 
estimated conditional logit models for the two sub-samples. This provides estimates of how each variable 
influences buyers’ location choices, conditional on the buyer having already chosen a channel. Results 
appear in Table 3. 
Table 3: Results of buyer facility choice model conditional on having chosen a channel. 
Conditional on Physical Channel Conditional on Electronic Channel 
Coefficient Coefficient 
β1: NormPrice -0.415 (0.039) *** -0.848 (0.153) *** 
β2: Distance -0.007 (0.000) *** -0.005 (0.000) *** 
β3: Supply 0.067 (0.001) *** 0.143 (0.002) *** 
β4: AvgCondition 0.120 (0.009) *** 0.216 (0.029) *** 
β5,k: Facility constants included included  
n (number of choices) 207,484  20,236  
Log likelihood  -82407.82  -8258.58  
Robust standard errors in parentheses.         *** p < 0.01 
 
As a next step, we included the channel choice in the specification by using a nested logit model, 
which essentially allows us to estimate the two sub-samples shown in Table 3 simultaneously. The nests 
represent the buyer’s option to purchase from a facility using either the physical or electronic channels. 
This allows us to model the buyer’s choice of facility and channel, although our focus remains on how 
buyers choose a facility conditional on having chosen a channel. The nesting structure is illustrated in 
Figure 4. 
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Figure 4: Illustration of the nesting structure for the nested logit model. 
 
In the nested logit specification, each facility appears twice in a buyer’s choice set: once in the 
physical channel nest and once in the electronic channel nest. For example, assume that vehicles of 
make/model j are being auctioned in Charlotte and New Orleans on day t. Because buyer i can purchase 
using either the physical or electronic channels, he has four alternatives for purchasing this vehicle: 
physically in Charlotte, physically in New Orleans, electronically in Charlotte, and electronically in New 
Orleans. This means that a change in a variable such as NormPricejkt affects both the physical and 
electronic alternatives for facility k in a choice set. A feature of the nested logit is that it increases the 
probability that buyers substitute within nests (i.e., channels in our case) rather than across nests (Train, 
2009). In our case, the nested logit increases the probability that a change in a variable such as an increase 
in NormPricejkt will cause a buyer to buy from a different facility using his preferred channel (i.e., to 
substitute within nests) rather than to buy from the same facility using the other channel (i.e., to substitute 
across nests.) 
We included in the buyer’s utility function a dummy variable for alternatives in the electronic nest 
(Electronicc) and interacted that with the price, distance, supply, and condition variables to capture how 
their explanatory power differ across channels. To capture dynamics in buyers’ use of the electronic 
channel vis-à-vis the physical channel, we constructed Electronic_Propensityit, which is the proportion of 
buyer i's 10 (or fewer if necessary) purchases prior to day t made via the electronic channel. It measures 
the strength of buyer i’s preference for the electronic channel. We interacted Electronic_Propensityit with 
Electronicc. This allows the latent utility of the electronic channel to change as a buyer i uses it more (or 
less). To summarize, we modeled the utility of each alternative (which consists of a channel c / facility k 
combination) for buyer i purchasing a vehicle(s) of model j on day t as:  
 Uijckt = β1*NormPricejkt  + β2*Distanceik + β3*Supplyjkt + β4*AvgConditionjkt + 
β5*Electronicc*NormPricejkt  + β6*Electronicc*Distanceik + β7*Electronicc*Supplyjkt + 
β8*Electronicc*AvgConditionjkt + ∑ =Kk 2 β9,k*Facility(k) + β10*Electronicc + ∑ =Kk 2 β11,k* 
Electronicc*Facility(k) + β12*Electronicc*Electronic_Propensityit + εijckt 
(1) 
Electronic
Facility A -
Electronic
Facility B -
Electronic
Facility C -
Electronic
Physical
Facility A -
Physical
Facility B -
Physical
Facility C -
Physical
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∑ =Kk 2 Facility(k) are dummy variables for each facility. Note that the combination of β9,k, β10, and 
β11,k form the alternative-specific constants for this model. Results appear in Table 4. 
Table 4: Results of buyer channel/facility choice model using a nested logit specification. 
Coefficient (Std. Error) 
β1: NormPrice -0.388 (0.038) *** 
β2: Distance -0.007 (0.000) *** 
β3: Supply 0.068 (0.001) *** 
β4: AvgCondition 0.105 (0.008) *** 
β5: Electronic*NormPrice -0.752 (0.144) *** 
β6: Electronic*Distancei 0.002 (0.000) *** 
β7: Electronicc*Supply 0.064 (0.002) *** 
β8: Electronicc*AvgCondition 0.239 (0.028) *** 
β10: Electronic -13.872 (0.490) *** 
β12: Electronic*Electronic_Propensity 19.262 (0.696) *** 
β9,k: Facility(k) included  
β11,k: Electronic*Facility(k) included  
Inclusive value (physical nest) 0.424 (0.009)  
Inclusive value (electronic nest) 0.273 (0.010)  
n 313,252  
Log likelihood -149784.1  
*** p < 0.01 
 
The coefficient for Electronicc (β10 = -13.872) is negative and significant. This indicates that 
purchasing via the electronic channel generates substantial disutility. However, the positive and 
significant coefficient for Electronicc*Electronic_Propensityi,t (β12 = 19.262) indicates that the utility of 
the electronic channel increases with a buyer’s propensity to use it. The coefficient for NormPricej,k,t (β1 = 
-0.388) is negative and significant, as is the coefficient for Electronicc*NormPricej,k,t (β5 = -0.752). The 
combined coefficient (β1 + β5 = -1.140) represents the disutility of price when purchasing via the 
electronic channel, which is 194% greater ([(β1+ β5)/β1] – 1, formatted as a percentage) than the disutility 
of price when purchasing via the physical channel. The coefficient for Distancei,k (β2 = -0.007) is negative 
and significant, while the coefficient for Electronicc*Distancei,k (β6 = 0.002) is positive and significant. 
This indicates that the disutility of distance is 29% less when purchasing via the electronic channel. The 
combined coefficient (β2 + β6 = -0.005) is negative and significant. This indicates that buyers still prefer 
nearby facilities when using the electronic channel, but less so than when using the physical channel. 
We summarize these results as follows. A buyer is more likely to be in the electronic “nest” (i.e., to 
choose the electronic channel) as his experience with the electronic channel grows. When in the electronic 
“nest”, a buyer is less sensitive to distance when choosing a facility, because he doesn’t have to travel to 
the facility if he is using the electronic channel. When in the electronic “nest”, a buyer is more sensitive to 
price when choosing a facility, because the electronic channel provides him with better information about 
average prices across facilities. Put together, these results indicate that buyers are more likely to shift their 
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demand from nearby facilities where prices are high to more distant facilities where prices are low as their 
use of the electronic channel increases.  
4.2 Seller Behavior: As noted in Section 3, the relevant seller behavior for our analysis is how sellers 
choose the facilities at which to sell vehicles. Although sellers do not use the electronic channel, we posit 
that buyers’ use of the channel will influence sellers’ distribution choices. We examine this via a discrete 
choice model.  
Each auctioned vehicle represents a choice made by the seller to sell that vehicle at a given facility 
rather than alternative facilities. Each facility provides differential utility to the seller based on factors 
such as recent prices at the facility, the recent supply of similar vehicles, and the historical propensity of 
the seller to sell vehicles at the facility. Specifically, we model the utility of facility k for seller s selling a 
vehicle of make/model j at time t as:  
 Ujkst = β1*RecentNormPricejkt  + β2*PctBuyerElectronickt + β3*DistributionPropensityjkst  + 
β4*RecentSupplyjkt + β5* RecentNormPricejkt * PctBuyerElectronickt + β6* 
DistributionPropensityjkst * PctBuyerElectronickt + ∑ =Kk 2 β7,k*Facility(k) + εjkst 
(2) 
RecentNormPricejkt is the average normalized price (normalized price = price / valuation; see Table 1) 
for vehicles of model j sold at facility k in the 3 weeks prior to week t. This accounts for the (dis)utility of 
recent (low) high prices at a facility. PctBuyerElectronickt is the percentage of purchases by buyers 
assigned to facility k that were made in the electronic channel in week t. This influences the utility of 
facility k for a seller because it represents whether buyers local to facility k are a “captive” buying group 
or are likely to shift their demand out of facility k. DistributionPropensityjkst is the number of vehicles of 
model j that seller s sold at facility k divided by the number of vehicles of model j that seller s sold at all 
facilities, both in the 52 weeks (or fewer for observations in year 2003) prior to week t. This captures 
unobserved factors that influence seller distribution decisions, including habit. RecentSupplyjkt is the 
number of vehicles of model j sold by any seller at facility k in the 3 weeks prior to day t. ∑ =Kk 2
Facility(k) are dummy variables for each facility and serve as alternative-specific constants in the model. 
Table 5 provides descriptive statistics. 
Another variable that affects the seller’s utility is the distance between a vehicle’s location prior to 
entering the market and each facility k. We cannot include this variable in the model because the vehicle’s 
location prior to entering the market is unobserved. However, we believe that some of this effect is 
captured in DistributionPropensityjkst. This is because one of the reasons that a seller is likely to have a 
high (low) propensity to sell vehicles at a facility is because the facility is close (far) to the vehicle. 
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics for variables in the seller choice model. 
Variable Description Mean (St. Dev.) 
RecentNorm
Pricejkt 
Average normalized price (price / valuation) for vehicles of model j sold at 
facility k in the 3 weeks prior to day t. 
0.98 (0.09) 
PctBuyer 
Electronickt  
Percentage of purchases by buyers assigned to facility k that were made in the 
electronic channel in week t. 
0.10 (0.12) 
Distribution 
Propensityjkst 
Number of vehicles of model j that seller s sold at facility k divided by the 
number of vehicles of model j that seller s sold at all facilities, both in the 52 
weeks (or fewer for observations in year 2003) prior to week t. 
0.03 (0.15) 
Recent 
Supplyjkt 
Number of vehicles of model j sold by any seller at facility k in the 3 weeks prior 
to day t. 
5.93 (16.75) 
 
We estimated the model using a conditional logit specification. Results appear in Table 6. 
Table 6: Results of seller distribution choice model. 
 Coef. Std. Err z-stat  
β1: RecentNormPricejkt 0.114 0.036 3.14 *** 
β2: PctBuyerElectronickt -0.495 0.331 -1.50  
β3: RecentNormPricejkt*PctBuyerElectronickt -1.155 0.333 -3.47 *** 
β4: RecentSupplyjkt 0.002 0.000 24.44 *** 
β5: DistributionPropensityjkst 8.718 0.028 316.39 *** 
β 6: DistributionPropensityjkst*PctBuyerElectronickt 6.152 0.250 24.56 *** 
Β7,j: Facility(k) included 
n (number of choices) 509,497 
Log likelihood -606,901 
*** p < 0.01 
 
The coefficient for RecentNormPricec (β1 = 0.110) is positive and significant, and the coefficient for 
RecentNormPricejkt*PctBuyerElectronickt (β3 = -1.093) is negative and significant. This shows that recent 
prices provide positive utility to sellers when making distribution decisions but that this utility becomes 
weaker with increased use of the electronic channel by the buyers local to that facility. This suggests that 
the demand shifting enabled by the electronic channel is causing sellers to become less strategic about 
vehicle distribution, which is as expected based on the logic outlined in Section 3. Further evidence of 
this is provided by the coefficients for DistributionPropensityjkst and 
DistributionPropensityjkst*PctBuyerElectronickt (β5 and β6), which are both positive and significant. This 
indicates that sellers tend to sell vehicles where they have sold them in the past (which is likely due to 
geographic proximity, at least in part), and they have become even more likely to do so as electronic 
trading has increased. 
In addition to the separate estimation of supply and demand just presented, we also investigated 
simultaneous estimation. See Appendix B for details. 
4.3 The Effect of Behavioral Changes on Geographic Price Variance: The results in Sections 4.1 
indicate that buyers exploit geographic price variance by purchasing from facilities where prices are low 
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(and thereby eschewing purchasing from facilities where prices are high.) This demand-shifting is 
facilitated by the electronic channel and has become more pronounced as use of the electronic channel has 
grown. The results in Sections 4.2 indicate that sellers exploit geographic price variance by allocating 
supply to facilities where prices have been high. Contrary to the demand side, however, this behavior has 
become less pronounced as use of the electronic channel has grown. Essentially, sellers are becoming less 
strategic about vehicle distribution as electronic channel use has grown, because any pricing inefficiencies 
that a seller might otherwise exploit are increasingly likely to be eliminated once the auctions start by 
buyers using the electronic channel.  
The change in buyer behavior should lower geographic price variance by better matching demand to 
the available supply across facilities. On the other hand, the change in seller behavior should not lower 
geographic price variance. If anything, it might increase geographic price variance, because sellers are 
less likely to shift supply to match expected demand. Thus, any relationship we find between changes in 
buyer behavior and geographic price variance should be in the correct direction but may be conservative. 
To examine (and attempt to quantify) how the change in buyer behavior due to the electronic channel 
has lowered geographic price variance, we focused on the specific mechanism through which this should 
occur: what we refer to a “cross-facility purchase.” We define this as a purchase in which a buyer local to 
facility A purchased from facility B. Figure 5 shows that most purchases made via the electronic channel 
are “cross-facility” and that the total number of cross-facility purchases increased over time. This increase 
is attributable to increased use of the electronic channel over time. 
Figure 5: Number of cross-facility purchases over time. 
 
Notes: The large cross-facility statistics for the first few quarters for electronic transactions are an artifact of the low 
number of electronic transactions for these quarters. 
Figure 6 illustrates how cross-facility purchases should lower geographic price variance by providing 
a hypothetical example of supply (represented by the vehicle icons) and demand (represented by the 
people icons) in Charlotte, New Orleans, and Miami. Note that prices (as a percentage of market value) 
are higher in Charlotte than in New Orleans. Because buyers using the electronic channel are more 
sensitive to price and less sensitive to distance (as shown in the buyer choice model), an electronic buyer 
in Charlotte (shown in red) is likely to shift his demand to New Orleans. Because prices are determined 
via an ascending auction, this “cross-facility purchase” will cause the expected prices in Charlotte to fall 
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buyers local to facility k, b) counted the number of vehicles of model j purchased at facility k by buyers 
local to facility l, and c) summed the two. We constructed SameFacilityPurchasesjklt analogously, except 
that SameFacilityPurchasesjklt measures purchases made by buyers local to facility k (facility l) at facility 
k (facility l.) The sum of CrossFacilityPurchasesjklt and SameFacilityPurchasesjklt is the total number of 
purchases of vehicles of model j made by the buyers local to either of the facilities in the pair at either of 
the facilities in the pair. Thus, including SameFacilityPurchasesjklt allows us to control for this overall 
volume. Distancekl is the distance in miles between facilities k and l, which we scaled by dividing by 
1,000. We interacted Distancekl with CrossFacilityPurchasesjklt and SameFacilityPurchasesjklt. Because 
Distancekl does not vary over time, we could not include it as a main effect. 2008-2 20032t −=∑  timet represent 
dummy variables for each quarter, and cjkl represents a fixed effect. Descriptive statistics for the variables 
in specification 2 appear in Table 7. 
Table 7: Descriptive statistics for variables in the panel regression model. 
Variable 
 
Description 
Mean (St. Dev.) 
A B 
CVPricejklt Coefficient of variation of mean prices between facilities k and l for 
vehicles of model j in time period t. 0.16 (0.25) 0.11 (0.18) 
CrossFacility 
Purchasesjklt 
Number of purchases at facility l by buyers local to facility k (and 
vice versa) for vehicles of model j in time period t. 0.23 (1.62)
a 0.84 (3.00)a 
SameFacility 
Purchasesjklt 
Number of purchases at facility k by buyers local to facility k (and 
same for facility l) for vehicles of model j in time period t. 15.05 (30.22) 25.48 (42.18)
Distancekl Average distance in miles between facilities k and l, divided by 1000. 1.058 (0.635) 0.671 (0.503)
Column A: All facility pairs; Column B: Only facility pairs for which there was cross-facility purchasing. 
a CrossFacilityTransjklt measures the purchases by buyers local to facility k at one other facility l (and vice versa.) 
When purchases by buyers local to facility k at all other facilities are calculated, the volume of cross-facility 
purchasing is roughly equal to that of same-facility purchasing, as shown in Table 9. 
 
Results of specification 2 appear in column A of Table 8. There were 621,141 facility pairs in the 
panel. There was no cross-facility purchasing for 532,360 of these facility pairs. Column B shows the 
results after excluding these facility pairs; this allowed us to develop estimates for facility pairs with 
active cross-facility purchasing. 
Table 8 shows that cross-facility purchases have a negative relationship with price variance, as 
expected. Of interest is that both same-facility and cross-facility purchases negatively influence price 
variance, but the effect of cross-facility purchases is stronger; β1 and β3 are statistically different (p < 
0.01.) We attribute this to the following. Any transaction increases trading volume, which reduces price 
variance because it increases the amount of price information in the market. However, a cross-facility 
purchase has a particularly strong effect because buyers purchase across facilities partly to exploit price 
discrepancies, which accentuates the reduction in geographic price variance. The coefficient for the 
interaction between CrossFacilityTransjklt and Distancekl (β2) is positive and significant, showing that the 
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effect of cross-facility transactions weakens with distance. We believe that this is because although the 
electronic channel reduces some of the frictions associated with distant trade, buyers must still ship 
vehicles back to their locations. Thus, especially long-distance trades are less likely to be motivated by 
price considerations and should therefore have a smaller effect on geographic price variance.  
Table 8: Results of facility-pair price variance regressions. 
 A: All Facility Pairs B: Facility Pairs With Cross-Facility Trades 
 Coefficient Coefficient 
β1: CrossFacilityTransjklt -0.0016 (0.0001) *** -0.0017 (0.0001) *** 
β2: CrossFacilityTransjklt * Distancekl 0.0013 (0.0002) *** 0.0013 (0.0002) *** 
β3: SameFacilityTransjklt -0.0003 (0.0000) *** -0.0003 (0.0000) *** 
β4: SameFacilityTransjklt * Distancekl -0.0000 (0.0000) *** -0.0000 (0.0000)  
Intercept 0.1659 (0.0005) *** 0.1237 (0.0007) *** 
Time dummies included  included  
Vehicle model / Facility pair fixed effects included  included  
R2, including fixed effects 0.53  0.43  
n 3,986,978  1,100,421  
Robust standard errors in parentheses.                              *** p < 0.01.  
 
The average distance between buyer and facility for electronic transactions is 251 miles. Setting this 
as the distance and using the estimates from column B of Table 8, an additional cross-facility purchase by 
the buyers local to a facility pair decreases the coefficient of variation of an average vehicle model by 
0.0014. The mean of CVPricejklt for facility pairs with cross-facility purchasing is 0.11. This indicates that 
each additional cross-facility purchase for a facility pair separated by 251 miles is associated with a 1.3% 
decrease in the coefficient of variation of prices between the facility pair.  
There is a risk of reverse causality in the panel regression because low price variance between 
facilities might lead to few cross-facility transactions. However, if this were the direction of the effect, 
then there would be a positive relationship between CVPricejklt and CrossFacilityPurchasesTransjklt, 
which would make it more difficult to recover the negative relationship shown in Table 8. In addition, the 
results of the buyer choice model provide a clear mechanism through which causality flows from cross-
facility purchasing to price variance. Nevertheless, for robustness against this potential endogeneity 
concern, we instrumented CrossFacilityPurchasesjklt with CrossFacilityPurchasesjkl,t-1, i.e., the first lag. 
The first lag is a useful instrument when the endogeneity concern stems from reverse causality because it 
is not contemporaneous to the dependent variable. In the first stage regression, CrossFacilityPurchasesjkl,t-
1 is positively correlated with CrossFacilityPurchasesjklt (β = 1.07, std. error = 0.04). After 
instrumentation, the β1 and β2 coefficients in column B of Table 8 become -0.0060 (s.e. = 0.0005) and 
0.0061 (s. e. = 0.0007), respectively, which suggests that the results shown in Table 8 are in the correct 
direction but potentially conservative in magnitude. 
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As an additional test, we created a panel containing the total number of cross-facility purchases 
(CrossFacilityPurchasesjt), the total number of same-facility purchases (SameFacilityPurchasesjt), and 
the coefficient of variation of price (CVPricejt) for vehicles of model j in each time period t across all 
facilities in the U.S. (instead of between discrete facility pairs as above.) Table 9 shows descriptive 
statistics for these variables. 
 CVPricejt = α + β1 CrossFacilityPurchasesjt + β2 SameFacilityPurchasesjtt + 2008-2 20032t −=∑  βt  timet 
+ cj + εjt. 
(4) 
Table 9: Descriptive statistics for variables in specification 3. 
Variable Description Mean (St. Dev.)
CVPricejt Coefficient of variation of price for vehicles of model j in time period t. 0.23 (0.23) 
CrossFacility 
Purchasesjt 
Number of cross-facility purchases for vehicles of model j in time period t. 130.34 (307.12)
SameFacility 
Purchasesjt 
Number of same-facility purchases for vehicles of model j in time period t. 125.42 (338.05)
 
We estimated specification 4 using time dummies and fixed effects for vehicle models. Table 10 
shows the results. β1 is negative and significant. A one standard deviation increase in CrossFacilityTransjt 
is associated with a 13% decrease in CVPricejt. For reasons similar to those discussed above, we 
instrumented CrossFacilityTransjt with the first lag. In the first stage regression, CrossFacilityTransj,t-1 is 
positively correlated with CrossFacilityTransjt (β = 0.08, std. error = 0.03). After instrumentation, β1 
becomes -0.0004 (std. error = 0.0001). This suggests that β1 is in the correct direction but conservative.  
Table 10: Results of country-wide price variance and price mean regressions. 
Coefficient 
β1: CrossFacilityTransj,t -0.0001 (0.0000) *** 
β2: SameFacilityTransj,t 0.0000 (0.0000)  
Intercept 0.2333 (0.0056) *** 
Time dummies included  
Vehicle model fixed effects included  
R2, including fixed effects 0.66  
n 8,017  
Robust standard errors in parentheses.                   *** p < 0.01.  
 
The results shown in Table 10 show that prices across the U.S. are becoming more uniform or what 
we call “flatter”, while the results shown in Table 8 show that the flattening effect of electronic trading 
weakens with distance. This presents a paradox: how can prices across the entire country be flattening 
when the flattening effect operates primarily on a regional basis? 
We offer two possible explanations. First, regional price flattening eliminates extremely high and low 
prices from the market, which will lower price variance for the country as a whole. Second, it is possible 
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6.1: Limitations: Although we limited heterogeneity among vehicles by restricting our sample to 
vehicles with between 15,000 and 21,000 miles, no two vehicles of the same model in our sample are 
identical. For example, a low mileage Chevrolet Malibu located at facility A differs from a low mileage 
Chevrolet Malibu at facility B on more dimensions than just location. Even if the two vehicles were 
identical when first manufactured (e.g., same color, same option packages), they are no longer identical 
after having been driven 15,000 miles. We address this by including multiple controls for vehicle quality, 
including normalizing price by valuation and including vehicle condition data. In our analysis of the 
change in geographic price variance, we cannot determine how much of the change we observe is due to 
increased cross-facility purchasing and how much is due to heterogeneity within vehicle models. 
However, we have no reason to believe that the heterogeneity within vehicle models changed 
significantly over the time span covered by our data, but we know that cross-facility purchasing increased 
during this time. Thus, we believe that the reduction in price variance we observe is attributable to 
demand shifts facilitated by the electronic channel, and that this holds despite noise due to vehicle 
heterogeneity.  
6.2: Intended Contributions: Our study links two research streams: 1) how electronic commerce 
affects price dispersion, and b) how electronic commerce affects geographic trade. The price dispersion 
stream has not considered the geographic location of products, despite the fact that it plays an important 
role in the trade of many products such as automobiles, food products, and raw materials. The geographic 
trade stream has not considered whether or how electronic commerce leads to lower price dispersion 
across locations. In joining these two streams, we make the following contributions. First, we document 
the behavioral mechanism by which electronic trading affects price dispersion, which is critical for 
continued empirical research in this stream (Baye et al. 2006). Specifically, our results show that buyers 
are more sensitive to price and less sensitive to distance when using the electronic channel than when 
using the physical channel. This increases the likelihood that buyers will eschew purchasing at a nearby 
facility to purchase at a remote facility where prices are lower. These cross-facility purchases are the 
mechanism that has led to lower price variance between facilities. Second, we show that the location of 
products and buyers plays an important role in buyer behavior and price dispersion. The distance between 
products and buyers influences how buyers choose the facility and channel from which to purchase and 
moderates the relationship between cross-facility trading and price dispersion.  
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Appendix A: Simple Proof of Why Cross-Facility Purchasing Should Reduce Geographic Price 
Variance 
What follows is a simple proof of why shifting a bidder from a high-priced location to a low-priced 
location lowers the price variance between locations.  
Setup: Let there be two open-outcry ascending auctions, each for a vehicle of model j (e.g., Honda 
Accord), where one auction occurs at facility A and one auction occurs at facility B. Denote the number 
of bidders at facilities A and B as na and nb, respectively. Each bidder draws a valuation vi for vehicles of 
model j from F(.), where ],[ vvvi ∈ . Denote the prices of the auctions at facilities A and B as pra and prb, 
respectively. Let |pra - prb| = δ. δ measures the variance between pra and prb because the absolute value of 
the difference of two numbers is equal to 2 times the standard deviation of the two numbers. 
Proposition: If the variance of prices between the two facilities is nonzero (i.e., if δ > 0), then shifting 
a bidder from the facility with the higher price to the facility with the lower price will reduce the variance 
of prices (or keep the variance the same.) More formally, if pra - prb = δ > 0, then shifting a bidder from 
facility A (such that na becomes na – 1) to facility B (such that nb becomes nb + 1) will yield |pra’ - prb’| = 
δ’ ≤ δ, where pra’ and prb’ are the auction prices after shifting the bidders. The converse is true if prb - pra 
= δ > 0. 
Proof: The proof is based on properties of order statistics. Using a well-known result from auction 
theory about open outcry auctions, the expected price is the valuation of the second-highest bidder. In an 
auction with n bidders, this means that the expected price is the (n-1)st order statistic from the distribution 
of those bidders’ valuations. To simplify the math, we assume that bidder valuations are drawn from a 
uniform distribution bounded by ],[ vv , although uniformity is not required. From the properties of a 
uniform distribution bounded by , the expected value of the (n-1)st  order statistic is )(
1
1 vv
n
nv −+
−+  
(Arnold et al., 1992). Thus, pra = )(
1
1 vv
n
nv
a
a −+
−+  and prb = )(
1
1 vv
n
nv
b
b −+
−+ , respectively. The proof is 
accomplished by showing that δ ≥ δ’, i.e., that 
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To show the proof, we manipulate this expression assuming pra > prb. The proof is analogous for prb 
> pra. For pra > prb, we can remove the absolute value operator from the left-hand side of (1) because it is 
always positive. We then examine two cases: a) pra’ ≥ prb’, and b) pra’ < prb’. For pra’ ≥ prb’, we can 
remove the absolute value operator from the right-hand side of expression 1. Collecting the na and nb 
],[ vv
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terms on each side of the above expression and performing some algebraic manipulation yields:
)1(
2
)1)(2(
2
+
−≥++ aabb nnnn
 , which always holds. For pra’ < prb’, we can remove the absolute value 
operator from the right-hand side of expression 1 after multiplying by -1. Note that when pra > prb, the 
only way for pra’ < prb’ to hold is if na = nb+1. Substituting na = nb+1, collecting the na and nb terms on 
each side of the above expression, and conducting some algebra yields: 
1
1
21
1
2 +
−++≥+
−++ b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n . Both sides of the expression are equal, so the expression holds.  
QED. 
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Appendix B: Simultaneous Estimation of Supply and Demand in a Choice Setting in Which Prices 
are Determined by Auction 
This appendix discusses the possibility of simultaneous estimation of supply and demand in our 
context. As background, consider that the most common simultaneous models of supply and demand in a 
non-linear discrete choice framework are based on the work of industrial economists such as Berry, 
Levinsohn, and Pakes (Berry et al., 1995; Berry, 1994). These models assume that sellers set prices based 
on an equilibrium pricing rule specified by the econometrician (see Train, 2009: chapter 13 for a thorough 
discussion.) For example, the econometrician might assume that the seller sets prices based on marginal 
cost or that the seller chooses a profit-maximizing price in an oligopoly setting, etc. These models do not 
apply in our context because sellers do not set prices in our context; prices are determined by auction. 
Also, it is not clear how a new method that is appropriate for an auction context might be constructed. 
Thus, standard methods for incorporating the supply side in a discrete choice framework are not 
applicable to our context. However, if we develop linear expressions for supply and demand, then we can 
estimate them simultaneously using established simultaneous equations methods. However, as we discuss 
below, we concluded that this approach is inferior to the separate estimation reported in the paper. 
Accordingly, we did not implement this method, although we describe it below. 
To develop linear expressions for supply and demand, we began with a structural model of individual 
choice based on utility maximization and then aggregated over individuals to yield linear models akin to 
“gravity models” (e.g., Blum & Goldfarb, 2006; Hortacsu et al., 2009). We begin with the construction of 
the linear demand model. 
Linear Demand Model 
Let s = seller, b = buyer, m = vehicle model, i,j = facility, c = channel, and t = week. Each buyer b has 
a “local” facility i determined based on his zip code.  
Let BjmN  = the total number of buyers of vehicles of model m who are local to facility j. The 
probability that a buyer b purchases a vehicle of model m from facility j at time t is: 
∑∈= Jj VBjm
VB
jmB
mtj B
jmt
B
jmt
eN
eN
P |           (B1) 
(B1) is a standard logit probability, weighted by BjmN . Weighting is necessary because the probability 
of purchasing at facility j increases with the number of buyers who are local to facility j.  
Let vmtN be the number of vehicles of model m that buyers purchased at time t at any facility. Let 
B
jmtQ
be the number of vehicles of model m that buyers purchased at facility j at time t. 
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∑∈== Jj VBjm
VB
jmv
mt
B
mtj
v
mt
B
jmt B
jmt
B
jmt
eN
eN
NPNQ |         (B2) 
Taking the log of (B2) yields: 
B
jt
B
jmt
B
jm
v
mt
B
jmt IVNNQ −++= lnlnln         (B3) 
where ∑∈= Jj VBjmBjt BjmteNI ln  and represents the population-weighted expected utility that a buyer 
receives from the choice situation. Absorb Ijt into a constant term, replace ∑ == Hh B jmthhBjmt XV 1 ,α , and add 
coefficients, an intercept, and a disturbance to yield the demand equation: 
B
jmt
B
jm
v
mt
H
h
B
jmthhjm
B
jmt NNXQ εδδαα ++++= ∑ = )(ln)(lnln 211 ,,0      (B4) 
Linear Supply Model 
Define the “grounding city” as the city in which a vehicle is located prior to its entering the market. 
We do not observe the grounding city, but we assume that the probability that a vehicle is in a given 
grounding city is proportional to the size of the grounding city. E.g., a vehicle is more likely to be 
grounded in Dallas, TX than in Darlington, SC. Let jPop  = the population of the city in which facility j is 
located. If we assume that sellers prefer to sell vehicles at facilities near the vehicles’ grounding city, all 
else equal, then we can write the probability that a seller s chooses facility j to sell a vehicle of model m at 
time t as: 
∑∈= Jj Vj
V
jS
mtj s
jmt
s
jmt
ePop
ePop
P |           (B5) 
Let vmtN  = the total number of vehicles of model m that sellers sell at time t at any facility. Let 
S
jmtQ  = 
the number of vehicles of model m that sellers sell at facility j at time t. 
∑∈== Jj Vj
V
jv
mt
S
mtj
v
mt
S
jmt s
jmt
s
jmt
ePop
ePop
NPNQ |         (B6) 
Taking the log of (B6) yields: 
s
jt
s
jmtj
v
mt
S
jmt IVPopNQ −++= )ln()ln()ln(         (B7) 
where ∑ ∈= Jj Vjsjt sjmtePopI ln  . Absorb Ijt into a constant term, replace ∑ == Kk S jmtkkSjmt XV 1 ,β  and add 
coefficients, an intercept, and a disturbance to yield the supply equation: 
S
jmtj
v
mt
S
jmtk
K
k kjm
S
jmt PopNXQ εγγββ ++++= ∑ = )(ln)(lnln 21,1,0      (B8) 
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B
jmtQ  
( SjmtQ ) is the number of vehicles of model m purchased (sold) at facility j at time t. Variables in 
B
jmthX ,  include: a) average price of vehicles of model m at facility j, b) number of vehicles auctioned (not 
necessarily sold) at facility j, c) the average propensity for buyers local to facility j to use the electronic 
channel, and d) interactions. S jmtkX , is similar. The interaction terms in these models allow us to test how 
buyers’ and sellers’ sensitivities to price changes as use of the electronic channel grows. The equilibrium 
condition is Sjmt
B
jmt QQ lnln =  (i.e., demand = supply.)  
Some Considerations with Simultaneous Estimation 
The distance to each facility for buyers and sellers is not considered in either of the linear supply or 
demand equations. This is unavoidable for sellers, because we don’t know where sellers store vehicles 
prior to their entering the market. We observe distance for buyers, but cannot include it in the linear 
demand equation because the linear demand equation measures BjmtQ . Measuring 
B
jmtQ allows us to use the 
“supply=demand” equilibrium condition Sjmt
B
jmt QQ lnln = . BjmtQ  is the total number of vehicles of model m 
purchased at facility j at time t by buyers located throughout the country. This means that a distance 
measure would have to be a weighted average of the distance to facility j from all buyers’ locations or 
some other measure of “remoteness.” This would provide a limited and indirect means of examining how 
the electronic channel affects buyers’ sensitivity to distance. Abstracting away from distance is a 
significant limitation because distance is what generates the friction that causes geographic price variance 
in the first place. 
Another consideration is that sellers have the option to sell or retain each auctioned vehicle (i.e., they 
can accept or reject the high bid). Thus, there are two seller behaviors at work in our context: a) where 
they choose to distribute vehicles, and b) whether they choose to sell the vehicles once they have 
distributed them. Section 4.2 directly models the first behavior. The linear supply equation above models 
some combination of both behaviors in that it accounts for how many vehicles sellers choose to sell at a 
facility k, with that number not to exceed the number of vehicles they had distributed there. We do not 
believe it possible to separate the two behaviors in this approach. Although both behaviors are relevant, 
the first behavior is more pertinent to the research question. This is because it is reasonable that sellers 
might systematically distribute vehicles in a way that affects geographic price variance (see the logic in 
Section 3.) It is less reasonable to expect that sellers systematically accept and reject high bids in a way 
that affects geographic price variance. 
Given these issues, we determined that separate estimation was the most appropriate approach for our 
context. Also, any concern about a simultaneity bias in our estimation is mitigated by our use of daily 
data and the sequential nature of buyer/seller behavior: sellers choose where to distribute vehicles before 
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buyers choose where to purchase vehicles. The sequential nature of the decisions allows us to include the 
relevant supply variables directly in the demand model and vice versa, and the daily data ensure that the 
sequence of behavior is not confounded by aggregating across multiple days. 
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